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CASTLE IN THE AIR:
A DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM FOR SPECTRUM
By Kevin Werbach*

This article envisions the foundational infrastructure for a true wireless
Internet. The domain name system (DNS) for addressing allowed the Internet to
scale as a decentralized, loosely-coupled system. A similar system for the
wireless communication would allow devices to negotiate frequently
assignments and other attributes dynamically. The traditional, static approach
to spectrum allocation creates massive inefficiencies, which will become
increasingly problematic as wireless demand grows. A DNS for spectrum could
be based on the database the Federal Communications Commission recently
mandated for devices operating in the “White Spaces” around broadcast
television channels. Such an infrastructure would enable rapid growth and
innovation in next-generation mobile devices and applications.

INTRODUCTION
In the early 1980s, the Internet faced a problem. The network of networks
was growing rapidly… too rapidly. The increasing number of connected systems
was overwhelming the simple system that tracked Internet host addresses. A
single, static list couldn’t keep up with the growing complexity and fluidity of the
Internet. The solution, defined in 1983, was an elegant mechanism called the
domain name system (DNS).1 The DNS established a separate, distributed
system for dynamic management of Internet addresses. Every time you type the
uniform resource locator (URL) of a website or send an email message, you
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invoke the DNS. More than twenty-five years later, through massive growth and
development of the Internet, the DNS continues to function effectively.
Today, wireless communication faces a similar problem. The rapidly
increasing volume of traffic, as well as the growing number and sophistication of
devices, threaten to overwhelm the simple, static spectrum allocation system
managed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and other
government agencies. Command-and-control allocation of frequencies is wildly
inefficient. As wireless data connections become increasingly common, the
absence of a dynamic spectrum allocation mechanism becomes an increasingly
severe restraint on the evolution of the Internet into a ubiquitous mobile
platform.
The answer is a solution similar to the DNS: a hierarchical distributed
database that brokers among those seeking and providing access to spectrum.
The foundations for such a system are being laid today, without policy-makers
realizing it. The FCC voted in late 2008 to authorize unlicensed wireless “White
Space Devices” (WSD), subject to the creation of a database of available
transmission slots throughout the country. This White Space Database could be
the foundation for a Spectrum Networking Database (SND) that plays a DNS-like
role in wireless communication. To achieve its potential, however, such a system
would need to address both technical and policy requirements. Successful
deployment of an SND would facilitate the continued development of a
ubiquitous wireless Internet.

I. SCALING: WIRELESS AND THE INTERNET
A. The Spectrum Challenge
As billions of mobile phones gain increasingly sophisticated data capabilities,
and trillions of wireless sensors are integrated with physical spaces and objects,
conventional approaches to spectrum management will crumble. Current
spectrum policy debates focus on initial allocations, such as the rules and auction
in 2008 for licenses in the 700 MHz band reclaimed from UHF television
stations.2 The real challenge, however, comes in implementation. The only way
to meet growing wireless capacity demands will be to view the spectrum as an
ocean of potential capacity, theoretically available to any local device at any time.
No centralized mechanisms, whether publicly or privately determined, can be

In re Serv. Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 & 777-792 MHz Bands, 22 F.C.C.R. 15289 (Aug.
10, 2007) (second report and order)
2
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sufficiently dynamic and localized for such a roiling ocean of wireless
communication.
To a first approximation, the future of the Internet is wireless. Today, there
are over 225 million mobile broadband users worldwide.3 That number nearly
doubled from 2008 to 2009.4 For telephone service, there are already more than
twice as many users of mobile phones as landlines worldwide. That means more
than two billion people who today own a mobile phone have never owned a
personal computer – and may never do so.
For most of its history, the Internet was primarily delivered to end users
through wired network connections. Wireless systems simply did not offer the
capacity and stability of their wired cousins, such as the landline telephone
network and coaxial cable television connections. Until the past decade, highspeed wireless data systems and the mobile devices to make use of them simply
were not available.5
In recent years, there has been an explosion of growth in wireless data.
Unlicensed wireless hotspots using the WiFi and related protocols for short range
connection have rapidly proliferated, as have laptops and other devices with the
capability to make use of these networks.6 Wide-area wireless data services for
the commercial market became feasible with latter version of digital mobile
phone technology (so-called 2.5G systems), and have taken off with the growth of
third-generation 3G mobile wireless technologies. In the US, all the major
wireless carriers including Verizon, AT&T, Sprint and T-Mobile now offer
nationwide wireless data coverage, with downstream speeds over one megabit
per-second. New entrants such as Clearwire promise even faster data speeds.
All this mobile data growth is causing huge increases in demand for wireless
capacity. The change is not merely in the absolute numbers, but in the quality of
usage. Apple’s phenomenally successful iPhone is the best example.7 The iPhone
connects to the same networks as other mobile phones, but it encourages much
more active usage because it provides a “real” Internet experience. Google found
the average iPhone user searched the Web fifty times more frequently than users
of less-capable phones.8 In the first few weeks after Apple introduced the iPhone

See Nick Wood, Global Mobile Broadband Subscriptions Near Quarter of a Billion, TOTAL
TELECOM, July 22, 2009, at http://www.totaltele.com/view.aspx?ID=447509.
3

4

See id.

Wireless data networks began to be deployed in the 1980s for special-purpose applications,
such as paging and fleet dispatch services. Metricom’s Ricochet system provided end-user
wireless data service beginning in 1994, but it was a proprietary offering with limited speed
and coverage area, which never gained significant traction.
5

6

See Wi-Fi: It’s Fast, it’s Here – and it Works, BUS. WEEK, Apr. 3, 2002.

7

Leslie Cauley, iPhone Gulps AT&T Network Capacity, USA TODAY, June 17, 2009.

Maija Palmer and Paul Taylor, Google Homes in on Revenues from Phones, FT.COM, Feb. 13,
2008, at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/667f13de-da60-11dc-9bb9-0000779fd2ac.html.
8
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3GS, featuring enhanced video recording capabilities, YouTube saw mobile video
uploads increase 400%.9
The iPhone is not an outlier; it is a harbinger of things to come. AT&T
Wireless predicts that broadband wireless data capacity demands will increase by
a factor of 250 to 600 times between 2008 and 2018.10 More efficient
technologies will provide some increase in capacity. For example, fourthgeneration wireless systems such as Long Term Evolution (LTE) and WiMax
promise to deliver greater capacity in the same spectrum as current 3G systems.
These upgrades alone, however, will never match the scope of increased demand
that is forecasted.
Adding new capacity by allocating licenses to new spectrum bands is also not
a viable long-term solution. There have been no significant usable “empty”
frequency bands for some time. The “low-hanging fruit” for clearing small-scale
incumbent uses to reallocate frequencies for more valuable broadband data uses
has already been tapped.11
The terrible irony is that spectrum utilization today is wildly inefficient.12
Spectrum is not actually scarce, at least not to anywhere near the extent it
seems.13 The frequency allocation table shows a dense checkerboard. However,
measurements of actual wireless activity show a radically different picture: Most
frequency bands are not actually used for transmission most of the time, in most
places. In fact, a study of wireless utilization in the frequencies below 3 GHz
showed that only about five percent of bands were in use, on average.14 Even in

YouTube Blog, YouTube Mobile Uploads Up 1700% in 6 Months; 400% Since iPhone 3GS
Release, at http://www.youtube.com/blog?entry=kbaLH7fmm-g.
9

10

Rysavy Research, Mobile Broadband Spectrum Demand, Dec. 2008, at 12.

See Susan P. Crawford, The Radio and The Internet, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 934
(2008) (calling the January 2008 auction of 700 MHz frequencies, “probably the last
competitive auction for a substantial amount of spectrum for the next few decades….”).
11

See Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless
Communication, 82 TEXAS L. REV. 863 (2004); Phil Weiser, The Untapped Potential of
Wireless
Spectrum,
Brookings
Institute
Report,
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/07_wireless_weiser.aspx; Victor Pickard and
Sascha D. Meinrath, “Revitalizing the Public Airwaves: Opportunistic Reuse of Government
Spectrum,” Wireless Future Working Paper, New America Foundation (June 2009),
forthcoming in International Journal of Communications (2009).
12

13

14

See Supercommons, supra note 12.

See Mark McHenry, Dupont Circle Spectrum Utilization During Peak Hours, A
Collaborative Effort of The New America Foundation and The Shared Spectrum Company,
New
America
Foundation
Issue
Brief
(2003),
available
at
http://www.newamerica.net/files/archive/Doc_File_183_1.pdf;
Mark
McHenry,
NSF
Spectrum Occupancy Measurements: Project Summary, Shared Spectrum Company (August
2005)), available at http://www.sharedspectrum.com/measurements/.
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New York City, the most densely populated metropolitan area, the number was
only thirteen percent.15
The reality is that most spectrum licensees do not, or cannot, use their
frequencies in anywhere near the most efficient possible manner.16 In some cases
this is due to the inflexibility of FCC licenses and the legacy characteristic of old
systems. For example, broadcast television allocations were made in the 1940s.
They required a substantial percentage of the frequencies to be dark as guard
bands, because receivers were not sophisticated enough to distinguish signals
otherwise.17
Both the demand and the supply of spectrum are inherently local, short-term
phenomena.18 Whether one system can transmit without inhibiting the ability of
other systems to do so depends on a multitude of factors, including the technical
characteristics of the transmitters and receivers; the nature of the services
involved; and the physical geography of the area. And the situation will change
over time. The wireless capacity that is “wasted” is bounded by time, geography,
and technical characteristics. It cannot be specified globally for all time. Only a
system with up-to-date local information can identify the full opportunity space
for wireless communication.
The existing spectrum allocation structure is so inefficient because it is
inherently static and centralized. Whether a device in Omaha, Nebraska can
transmit at ten watts of power at 488 MHz (UHF television channel 17) at
2:00pm this Thursday is a determined by a decades-old table of frequency
allocations issued by the FCC.19 The frequency table answers the question of who
is legally permitted to transmit in a designated frequency band across a large
geographic area. It does not address two more important questions: who is
actually transmitting in those frequencies, and who else could transmit without
disturbing the licensee.

See id. And this was during the Republican National Convention in New York, a time of
extremely high wireless use.
15

The FCC itself acknowledges that we face not a spectrum capacity problem, but a spectrum
access problem. See Federal Communications Commission, Spectrum Policy Task Force
16

Report,
ET
Docket
No.
02-135
http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/reports.html.

(November,

2002),

available

at

17

See Randy Hoffner, White Space Devices: Threat to Broadcast TV?, TV Tech., Dec. 5, 2007,
at http://www.tvtechnology.com/pages/s.0079/t.10086.html; Sascha D. Meinrath & Michael
Calabrese, White Space Devices” & the Myths of Harmful Interference, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 495 (2008).
18

See Supercommons, supra note 12.

Moreover, spectrum allocations until recently were specific as to service. A television
broadcaster cannot decide its license would be more efficiently or profitably used to offer
mobile data services; it must operate a broadcast system or nothing at all.
19
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The static spectrum allocation system is a historical artifact. Until recently,
wireless systems generally lacked the ability to sense the environment around
them. They could merely transmit or receive in a narrow range of frequencies,
using specific waveforms. A television receiver, for example, could only look for
television transmitters with sufficient signal strength to reach it. In the case of
older services such as television, those receivers were assumed to be very poor by
today’s standards at identifying the relevant signals. As a result, huge swaths of
spectrum were designated as buffer space between allocated frequencies. All
those decisions were made centrally, by the FCC. It issued licenses that
authorized certain transmitters and forbid all others.
This “command and control” spectrum allocation process was workable when
wireless communications systems were limited, but breaks down today. When
wireless networks were predominantly one-way, large-area, fixed radio and
television systems or point-to-point relays, and overall wireless demand was
small compared to the present, the inefficiencies were relatively small. The
higher the level of demand, and the more dynamic the systems involved, the less
a command-and-control approach can approach optimal efficiency. In a world of
ubiquitous wireless broadband, the viability of the existing spectrum allocation
process is increasingly called into question.20
The only viable solution for the wireless capacity crunch is therefore a
distributed one. Spectrum allocation decisions must be made locally and for
limited durations. Cellular phone systems already do something like this in their
licensed spectrum, dynamically allocating capacity to handsets within range of
towers. The operator cannot anticipate all possible usage scenarios ahead of
time; it allocates some decision-making to software in each base station.
However, the cellular example is very limited. Cellular networks operate in
defined licensed spectrum bands for the purpose of supporting a particular
uniform service, with the ability to control handset technology directly.
The two main proposals for significant reform of spectrum allocation both
employ dynamic, local decision-making.21 Under the “property” approach,
spectrum licensees would be granted property rights to use or sell their spectrum
as they pleased.22 This approach traces its intellectual history to a famous 1959

20

See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 239 (MIT Press 2005).
For a comparison of property and commons models for spectrum, See Supercommons,
supra note 12; Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the
Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 287 (1998); Gerald R. Faulhaber &
David Farber, Spectrum Management: Property Rights, Markets, and the Commons
(working
paper),
at
http://rider.wharton.upenn.edu/~faulhabe/SPECTRUM_MANAGEMENTv51.pdf; Eli Noam,
The
Fourth
Way
for
Spectrum,
FT.com,
May
29,
2003,
at
http://news.ft.com/comment/columnists/neweconomy.
21

22

See Supercommons, supra note 12.
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article by Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase, urging the FCC to assign property rights
rather than more-limited licenses.23 In a property system, decisions about what
to do with frequency blocks devolve from a central government regulator to a
collection of private owners. These owners can make local decisions about use
and access to their spectrum, including whether to sell that spectrum to another
owner who values it more.
The major alternative to the property approach, the so-called “commons”
model, is even more distributed and dynamic.24 Under a commons approach,
anyone can transmit, subject to technical standards. Devices must negotiate
themselves to avoid interference. The best example in practice of this model is
the WiFi technology operating in the 2.5 GHz and 5 GHz unlicensed bands.
Millions of WiFi base stations offer short-range connections in homes and
businesses, coexisting despite the absence of exclusive rights.25 The WiFi
protocol allows individual devices to mitigate interference locally, and individual
device owners can also coordinate transmission channels for more efficient
operation. As with the property approach, these decisions are superior to those
of command-and-control allocation because they are made “on the ground” in
response to local conditions, rather than being specified, indefinitely and ahead
of time, by a central regulator.
Technology is making such a dynamic spectrum allocation model feasible.
Historically, wireless devices could only operate on a limited range of frequencies
and transmit in very specific ways.26 These characteristics had to be defined
when the device was built, and built into the physical hardware. Moreover,
devices had little or no ability to understand the local spectral environment.
Numerous technical advances are changing radios into something entirely
different: adaptable connected digital platforms.27 Wireless devices today can be
“tuned” to different frequencies and waveforms through software,28 and can
manage interference through power limits or technical protocols.
These

23

Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1959).

24

See Supercommons, supra note 12.

25

See supra note 6.

See Supercommons, supra note 12; Kevin Werbach, Radio Revolution, New America
Foundation Working Paper (2002).
26

See Radio Revolution, supra note 26; Supercommons, supra note 12; Preston F. Marshall, A
Potential Alliance for World-Wide Dynamic Spectrum Access, New America Foundation
Wireless Future Program Issue Brief #25, June 2009; Crawford, supra note 11.
27

See William Lehr, et al., Software Radio: Implications for Wireless Services, Industry
Structure, and Public Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Program on Internet and
Telecoms Convergence (August 2002), at http://itc.mit.edu; Authorization and Use of
Software Defined Radios First Report and Order, 16F.C.C.R. 17373 (2001); Spectrum Policy
Task Force Report, ET Docket No. 02-135, Comments of Vanu, Inc. at 1-2.
28
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developments allow for a grand shift of spectrum utilization from static to
dynamic.29
Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) means that wireless devices could transmit
based on actual availability of capacity rather than pre-set rules of exclusive
frequency allocation.30 DSA techniques are the subject of extensive technical
research today.31 DARPA, the research and development arm of the US
Department of Defense, funded significant development work on adaptive radio
technologies which could be employed for DSA through it XG program.32
Academics have suggested technical rules and pricing mechanisms for
“secondary” users to access licensed spectrum on an as-need and as-available
basis.33 Even Google has entered the fray, proposing continuous real-time
auctions for spectrum capacity, analogous to the way it sells advertising on its
search engine.34
The limitation of all these proposals is the absence of a coordination
mechanism. Each envisions a particular DSA mechanism for a particular
purpose, even though the DSA concept is potentially applicable to the entire
usable spectrum.35 What is needed is a way to “flip the switch” from the static to
the dynamic paradigm. The missing piece for far-reaching spectrum reform is a
meta-infrastructure with the capacity to incorporate virtually all forms of
dynamic access, and both the property and commons allocation mechanisms.
The criteria for this notional spectrum meta-infrastructure bear a striking parallel
to an existing resource: the Internet’s domain name system.

B. Lessons from Internet Addressing

29

See Radio Revolution, supra note 26.

See John Chapin & William Lehr, The Path to Market Success for Dynamic Spectrum
Access Technologies, IEEE COMMS, May 2007, at 96; Qing Zhao & Brian Sadler, A Survey of
Dynamic Spectrum Access, IEEE SIGNAL PROCESSING, May 2007, at 79; Marshall, supra note
27.
30

See Douglas Sicker, The Technology of Dynamic Spectrum Access and its Challenges, IEEE
COMMS., JUNE 2007, AT 48. IEEE Communications, a leading technical journal in the field,
devoted a special issue to the topic in 2007, and research has only intensified since then. See
id.
31

See Christian Bourge, New Tech Feeds Spectrum Debate, WIRELESS NEWSFACTOR, June 30,
2003, at http://www.wirelessnewsfactor.com/perl/story/21828.html.
32

See Jon Peha and Sooksan Panichpapiboon, Real-Time Secondary Markets for Spectrum,
TELECOMMS. POL’Y, Aug.-Sept. 2004, at 603.
33

34

John Markoff, Google Proposes Innovation in Radio Spectrum Auction, N.Y. Times, May
22, 2007.
One exception is spectrum dedicated for radio astronomy, where any radiated energy
interferes with scientific research.
35
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Every computer network must have an addressing system. Witout unique
addresses, data could not flow from one point to another. On a single network,
addresses can be assigned and managed centrally, because one authority controls
all aspects of the system. The Internet, however is a network of networks.36
There is no central regulator. Addresses must be assigned by agreement of the
network operators or users. Remarkably, the Internet developed an addressing
structure that is robust, scalable, and flexible, despite these limitations. That
infrastructure is the domain name system (DNS).
The original Internet addressing mechanism was called the host name table.
In those days, prior to the mid-1980s, machines were directly connected to the
network, generally at universities or other research and government institutions.
Addresses were maintained in a single flat text file, maintained by a graduate
student named Jon Postel.37 As the Internet grew, this simple mechanism
became unworkable. The DNS was developed in 1983 by Paul Mockapetris to
replace it.38
The technical requirements and applications of the DNS were spelled out in a
series of protocol documents that were revised over time.39 There are many
aspects to the DNS, but at its core, the DNS is a special kind of database. Paul
Vixie, a long-time technical expert on Internet addressing, has called it “a
distributed, coherent, reliable, autonomous, hierarchical database, the first and
only one of its kind.”40 The DNS establishes a “domain name space” of
hierarchical zones, each served by an authoritative nameserver. For example, the
domain name “en.wikipedia.org” means the English-language sub-domain of the
Wikipedia domain, which is part of the .org (organization) generic top-level
category within the DNS. Information is cached and replicated both horizontally
– across multiple “root servers” or parallel local nameservers – and vertically –
from a higher-level server down to sub-domains.
Functionally, the DNS can be thought of as providing two interfaces: a “frontend” resolution service for end-users, and a “back-end” registration service for
network-connected resources. For end-users, the DNS seamlessly connects

Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and the
Forces Tearing it Apart, __ U.C. DAVIS L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2009).
36

Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You - Fool Us Twice Shame on Us:
What We Can Learn From the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the
Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, at 169 (2001); Brett M. Frischmann,
Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet Infrastructure: Rethinking Market
Intervention into Government and Government Intervention into the Market, COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. (2001).
37

38

See Kesan and Shah, supra note 37.

Jon Postel, RFC 1591: Domain Name System Structure and Delegation (Mar. 1994), at
ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1591.txt; ELLEN RONY & PETER RONY, THE DOMAIN NAME
HANDBOOK (1998).
39

40

Paul Vixie, DNS Complexity, ACM QUEUE, April 2007.
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human-readable domain names such as icanhascheezburger.com with the
numerical Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that the network’s routers
understand.41 For those who wish to be reached, the DNS provides a mechanism
to request a name, verify its availability, and associate it with an individual or
organization.
As the DNS evolved, three distinct components developed: registries,
registrars, and resolvers. A registry is the authoritative database for a top-level
segment of the DNS, such as .com or .cz. It maintains the records of which names
map to which IP addresses, and the official contact points for that registration.
Registrars interface directly with those who wish to register names. The registrar
function was originally combined with that of the registry, but at least for the
generic top-level domains such as .com and .org, there is now competition among
authorized registrars.42 Finally, individual devices and service providers can
operate local resolvers that match a user’s request for an address with the entry
specified in the registry. The resolver usually operates on a local cached copy of
the registry at the users Internet service provider.
These concrete functions only partially capture the significance of the DNS.
The unified addressing system is, on some level, what makes the Internet the
Internet.43 Without the ability to know that en.wikipedia.org is the Englishlanguage Wikipedia, there would be a collection of loosely connected private
networks, rather than a single Internet.44 And the DNS serves as foundational
infrastructure for new Internet applications and features, because it is so
universal.45
A review of the functions and history of the DNS reveals three key elements
that allowed the system to scale effectively: resolution separated from
transmission, distributed redundancy, and governance separated from
technology.
First, the DNS is a specialized piece of Internet infrastructure. Its only
function is to resolve addresses. The protocols for encoding and transmitting
data packets are completely separate, as are those defining particular applications

This served three purposes: people remember names better than numbers, the names can
stay stable when the numbers (tied to network topology) change, and allowed a single host to
correspond to multiple network addresses. See Jon Klensin, Role of the Domain Name Systm
(DNS), RFC 3467, Feb. 2003, at 3.
41

This was a significant outcome of the transition of domain name governance to ICANN. See
infra.
42

“[T]he DNS provided critical uniqueness for names, and universal accessibility to them, as
part of overall “single Internet” and “end to end” models….” See id. at 5.
43

See Centripetal Network, supra note 36; Christopher Rhoads, Endangered Domain, WALL
ST. JOURNAL, Jan. 19, 2006, at A1 .
44

See Klensin, supra note 41, at 2 (“In recent years, the DNS has become a database of
convenience for the Internet….”).
45
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such as the World Wide Web and voice communication.46 This separation helps
the Internet to grow and develop. Scaling the addressing system is a challenge
for the addressing system, not for the operators or users of other components of
the Internet.
Second, as Paul Vixie noted, the DNS is a distributed, hierarchical, redundant
system.47 There is one authoritative DNS database for each top-level domain, but
that database exists in many places. Billions of DNS queries take place every day,
but the overwhelming majority do not go all the way to the central root servers.
They are handled locally by caches and resolvers.
Third, the DNS is agnostic to how names are used. The DNS is a technical
creation to manage an operational requirement of a network of networks.
However, domain names are at the center of important policy and economic
activities, which become increasingly significant as the Internet grows. Domain
names potentially intersect with the law of trademarks and defamation, for
example.48 And the structure of the DNS shapes the degree to which the Internet
is truly international, or inherently tilted toward the US and Western countries.49
ICANN, the governance body established to oversee certain DNS management
functions, has waded into all these disputes. However, the technical architecture
of the DNS has remained the same. If the DNS does not solve all the nontechnical problems around Internet addressing, at least it permits the battles
around them to be fought in non-technical domains.

II. FROM WHITE SPACES TO SPECTRUM DNS
The rudiments of a DNS for the wireless Internet are being developed as an
outgrowth of the FCC’s decision to authorize unlicensed White Space Devices
around former broadcast television bands. To implement the White Spaces
decision, the FCC required devices to query a real-time database of utilization in
the relevant frequency bands. Properly designed, this system could be the basis
for a distributed dynamic routing database, analogous to the DNS on the wired
Internet.
Applications can be assigned to port numbers, which are part of the larger Internet
addressing system, if not the DNS itself. And the DNS has a specialized component built in for
email, known as the MX record.
46

47

See Vixie, supra note 40.

See generally MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING
CYBERSPACE (2002) (detailing the tortured history of domain name management); Kesan
and Shah, supra note 37.
48

OF

See Centripetal Network, supra note 36; Geoff Huston, Addressing the Future of the
Internet, ISP COLUMN, Feb. 2007, http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2007-02/addresspaper.html;
49
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To achieve such a result, however, the database must not be limited to White
Space devices alone. The FCC and industry must also take care to avoid the
mistakes and failings of the current DNS infrastructure. These include the
imposition of artificial scarcities, the creation of a private monopolist, and the
bureaucratization of technical management functions. The Internet may have
been a happy accident, but there is no excuse today for ignoring the
infrastructural demands of its next instantiation.

A. The White Space Database
The White Space Database presents a singular opportunity to apply the DNS
model to wireless communication. When the FCC allocated spectrum for
broadcast television in the 1940s, it deliberately left many channels dark to avoid
interference.50 For example, channel 4 was licensed in New York but not in
Philadelphia, and vice versa, so that receivers in each city would not become
confused by overlapping signals. Many other frequencies in the TV broadcast
bands are un-used as interference protection, Moreover, every available channel
is not licensed in each city, and many licensees do not actually transmit,
especially with most viewers receiving television content through cable or
satellite connections rather than over the air. A 2005 study by the public interest
group Free Press confirmed that most TV broadcast channels are simply not in
use.51
These so-called TV White Spaces are perhaps the most egregious example of
the inefficiency of the current spectrum allocation regime.52 They are considered
“beachfront spectrum” because of their location on the frequency chart.
Generally, the lower the frequency, the better the propagation of a wireless signal.
A lower-frequency system can serve a larger geographic area and penetrate
obstructions such as trees and building walls more easily than a higher-frequency
system, all things being equal. Lower frequencies tend to be dedicated to older
services, and thus are less likely to be made available for new systems. The
broadcast frequencies have the capability to support valuable wireless broadband
services, and may be especially useful for delivering broadband connectivity in
rural areas.53
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See Meinrath & Calabrese, supra note 17; NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 20.

See Free Press study, at http://www.freepress.net/docs/whitespace_analysis.pdf. See also
McHenry, supra note 14.
51

The designation is something of a misnomer, as there is nothing inherently linking the
subject frequencies to television broadcasting beyond historical legacy.
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See Crawford, supra note 11; Meinrath & Calabrese, supra note 17; Pierre de Vries,
Populating the Vacant Channels: The Case for Allocating Unused Spectrum in the Digital TV
Bands to Unlicensed Use for Broadband and Wireless Innovation (New Am. Found., Working
Paper
No.
14,
2006),
available
at
http://www.newamerica.net/files/WorkingPaper14.DTVWhiteSpace.deVries.pdf; J.H. Snider,
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In 2004, the FCC sought comment on whether to allow unlicensed devices to
transmit in the TV White Spaces.54 Advocates and technical experts weighed in
on both sides regarding the potential for interference. Broadcasters expressed
concern that unlicensed white space devices would harm TV reception.
Manufacturers and users of wireless microphones which operate in these bands
expressed similar objections.55 The FCC concluded in 2006 that unlicensed white
space devices could operate without producing excessive interference.56 It
initiated a testing process for prototype devices to verify this finding.57
Companies such as Microsoft, Philips, and Motorola developed equipment The
testing concluded in October 2008 with a finding that white space devices could
detect and avoid nearby television systems and wireless microphones.58
In November 2008, the FCC allocated the TV White Spaces for unlicensed
use.59 However, important issues remain unresolved before the White Space
order can go into effect. The FCC left significant technical and implementation
issues to a further stage of the proceeding.60 In March 2009, the incumbent TV
broadcasters sued the FCC to overturn the decision.61 And during the same
period, President Obama’s nominee as FCC Chairman, Julius Genachowski, took
over for the Bush Administration’s Kevin Martin.
There is at this moment, therefore, a significant opportunity to shape the
White Space proceeding. The FCC has expressed its intent to move forward, but
the actual structure can still be shaped. In parallel with the regulatory decisions,

Reclaiming the Vast Wasteland: The Economic Case for Re-Allocating the Unused Spectrum
(White Space) Between TV Channels 2 and 51 to Unlicensed Service, New Am. Found., Feb.
2006, available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/archive/Doc File 2898 1.pdf.
Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, ET Docket No. 04-186, FCC 04-113
(2004).
54

There are a handful of other authorized uses of the bands, including auxiliary transmission
services for broadcasters and cable television head-end systems.
55

First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making in the Matter of
Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, ET Docket No. 04-186 and 02-380, October
18, 2006.
56

57

See id.

FCC Office of Engineering and Technology “Evaluation of the Performance of Prototype TVBand White Space Devices Phase II,” OET Report FCC/OET 08-TR-1005, Oc. 15, 2008,
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-08-2243A3.pdf.
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Federal Communications Commission, Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands,
Second Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, ET Docket No. 04-186, ET
Docket No. 02-380, FCC 08-2360 (released November 14, 2008) [White Spaces order].
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See id.
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the 802.22 subgroup of the IEEE is developing technical standards for devices
that could operate in the White Spaces.
The FCC’s November 2008 order introduced a new requirement of a database
to protect against interference from white space devices.62 TV White Space
devices would be required to incorporate geo-location capabilities, meaning they
would have the ability to determine their physical location either directly or
through communication with a fixed base station.63 Before transmitting, each
device would have to check the White Space database to identify broadcasters
and others operating in that area.64 This way, the device could be sure it was “in
the clear” to use a vacant channel.
The White Space Database emerged from the FCC proceeding as a pragmatic
solution to a narrow concern, but has the potential to become something much
greater. The database was a response to broadcasters’ objections that regulators
could not rely on the spectrum-sensing capabilities of White Space devices
themselves to protect pre-existing users. However, the few lines in the FCC order
concerning the database leave open a great deal of room to determine how it
should be structured, implemented, and governed. The database will be a piece
of software and networking infrastructure, analogous to the DNS. And there is
no fundamental reason it must be limited to broadcast white spaces.65
A coalition called the White Space Database Group has taken the lead in
recommending the architecture for the system.66 The group proposed a structure
broadly similar to the DNS, with the possibility for distributed data storage and a
split between registries and registrars (which it calls repositories and service
providers), as well as the potential for dedicated resolvers (called query
services).67 In short, the White Space Database could be the foundation for a
DNS of wireless spectrum.

B. Comparing Interference to Addressing
Spectrum management and Internet addressing are both mechanisms for
conflict resolution. In wireless communication, the potential conflict is between
See White Spaces Order, supra note 59. The order also encouraged other mechanisms such
as spectrum sensing to prevent interference.
62
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See id.

64

See id.

See Michael Calabrese, The End of Spectrum ‘Scarcity’: Building on the TV Bands Database
to Access Unused Public Airwaves, New America Foundation Wireless Future Program
Working Paper No. 25 (June 2009).
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See Ex Parte Filing of the White Spaces Database Group, in ET Docket No. 04-186, April 10,
2009. Membership in the group includes Comsearch, Dell, Fox, Google, Microsoft, Motorola,
NCTA, sMSTV, NetLogix, Neustar and the Public Interest Spectrum Coalition.
67

See id.
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two systems that cannot effectively communicate at the same time, a
phenomenon known as interference.68 In addressing, the conflict is between two
systems that claim the same domain name.69 The DNS solves this conflict by
authoritatively linking an Internet protocol address (which is itself tied to the
physical topology of the network, and unique) with a domain name.70 The
equivalent process for spectrum is usually handled by the FCC, through its
command-and-control allocation of frequencies to designated licensees.71
Although they serve the same basic function, the DNS and current spectrum
management techniques do so in very different ways. Spectrum management is
prophylactic and fixed. The government decides ahead of time how a set of
frequencies can be used, and writes those into its licenses. The DNS, on the other
hand, does not associate a name to an IP address until the prospective user of
that name registers it. Registration only requires a check that the name is
unassigned. And the registration can be changed or transferred at any time. This
user-controlled system is therefore dynamic where traditional spectrum
allocation is static and inefficient.72
At first blush, there are substantial differences between the resolution
function of domain names and spectrum management.73 “Interference” with a
domain name means using the exact same string of alphanumeric characters.
Two domain names that vary by a single character may co-exist without difficulty.
With wireless systems, however, interference is a complex and contentious
concept.74 Whether a system interferes is not a stable physical property; it
depends on the system allegedly interfered with.75 The physics of wireless
As I explain in Supercommons, interference is something of a misnomer. The wireless
signals do not prevent each other from being received. They make it difficult for one or both
sets of devices to distinguish the desired signal from unrelated noise. See Supercommons,
supra note 12.
68

Addresses do not necessarily need to be globally unique to avoid this problem. DHCP and
NATs allow a hierarchical structure where only a portion of the network is subject to DNS. See
text at note 81.
69

The mapping need not be one-to-one. Several domain names can be aliased to one IP
address, or multiple IP addresses can be pointed to the same domain name.
70
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See Supercommons, supra note 12; Benkler, supra note 21; Noam, supra note 21; FCC
Spectrum Policy Task Force, supra note 16. In unlicensed bands, the FCC establishes
technical requirements for devices, which then manage interference locally. See Eli Noam,
Yesterday’s Heresy, Today’s Orthodoxy, Tomorrow’s Anachronism: Taking the Next Step to
Open Spectrum Access, 41 J. L. & ECON., 765 (1998).
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See Supercommons, supra note 12.
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See Supercommons, supra note 12; Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless
Communications, 16 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 25 (2002); David Weinberger, The Myth of
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Mar.
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2003,
at
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communication produce many spillover effects between systems.76 This is further
complicated by the nature of exclusive licenses. Incumbent licensees have every
incentive to make their devices cheap rather than robust to interference, and to
use the regulatory process to claim interference is occurring.77 The battles over
low-power FM radio and White Spaces show how intense these conflicts can
become.78 A cursory duplication check and a simple first-in-time allocation rule,
as the DNS uses, therefore do not suffice for wireless.
On further examination, however, the lines are not so clean in the DNS case
either. Because domain names are human-readable strings, there are situations
where a user may confuse them even if a computer does not. This becomes
important when a particular domain name has economic value associated with it.
This is widely the case with commercial websites and those overlapping
trademarks.79 Under both the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in
US law and the Uniform Dispute Resolution Process of ICANN, a registrant may
be forbidden from using a domain name even if it is not identical to one already
registered or trademarked.80 So-called “cybersquatting” that is malicious or
creates consumer confusion is prohibited. As the number of lawsuits in this area
demonstrates, deciding when that has occurred is complicated and contentious.
The analogy to spectrum interference debates is therefore not so far-fetched.
At a technical level, the closest analogy between dynamic spectrum brokering
and Internet addressing is DHCP, the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol.81
DHCP is one of many “hacks” to adapt the Internet architecture developed for
small-scale research internetworking to the requirements of today’s commercialscale global infrastructure.82 Because of the technical characteristics of the
Internet Protocol (IP) and historical address-allocation policies, most Internet
service providers cannot easily give each of their customers a unique IP address.83
Mobile access and nomadic connections to WiFi hotspots complicate the problem
even further. The solution is to assign users an address dynamically from a
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See id.
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See Supercommons, supra note 12.

See Stuart Minor Benjamin, THE LOGIC OF SCARCITY: IDLE SPECTRUM AS A FIRST AMENDMENT
VIOLATION, 52 Duke L.J. 1 (200) (lower power FM); supra note 53 (white spaces).
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See Mueller, supra note 48; Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(d);
Patrick Kelley, Note, Emerging Patterns in Arbitration Under the Uniform Domain-Name
Dispute-Resolution Policy, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 181.
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A. Michael Froomkin and Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, n.19
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Marjory S. Blumenthal & David D. Clark, Rethinking the Design of the Internet: The Endto-End Arguments vs. the Brave New World, in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN TRANSITION: THE
INTERNET AND BEYOND (Benjamin M. Compaine & Shane Greenstein eds., 2001); Upgrading
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common pool, each time they log on. Even if they have a broadband connection,
most residential users do not remain connected all the time. DHCP makes
dynamic IP address updates transparent to users.
With DHCP, a relatively small pool of IP addresses can be shared by a
relatively large pool of users. Each user ties up an address only when he or she
actually needs it. This efficiency gain parallels the greater efficiency that a more
dynamic structure could bring to spectrum allocation. The problem with DHCP,
and the related technique of Network Address Translation (NAT), is that they, as
already noted, they were post-hoc hacks rather than core Internet infrastructure
like the DNS. Because DHCP allocates addresses locally, there is no uniform
mechanism to associate users and addresses across the network. This adds
complexity to the Internet, and creates problems for some applications that
would benefit from end-to-end visibility.84 A DNS for wireless communication
would marry the efficiency gains of DHCP with the canonical reliability of DNS.
As discussed below, conflict resolution is in truth only an intermediate
function of both the DNS and spectrum allocation.85 Both the Internet address
space and the spectrum are notional constructs only.86 Conflicts over names and
frequencies are important only to the degree they have economic or social
consequences. A system that minimized conflicts and controversy, but too
heavily constrained productive use of the resource in question, would be a poor
tradeoff. The ultimate goal of the DNS, as described above, was to scale the
Internet.87 The ultimate goal of spectrum management should likewise be to
scale wireless capacity.88
The DNS, for its many flaws, has allowed the Internet to grow from a purely
research-oriented system linking a few thousand networks in 1983 to the global
backbone of commerce, entertainment, communication, and government activity
in 2009. To achieve something similar in spectrum requires an infrastructure for
dynamic and distributed intermediation of spectrum allocation decisions, just as
the DNS provides dynamic and distributed intermediation of address allocation
decisions.
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See Blumenthal & Clark, supra note 82.
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John Klensin, Role of the Domain Name System (DNS), RFC 3467, February 2003.
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THE SPECTRUM NETWORKING DATABASE

A. How the System Would Work
As has already been noted, a great deal of technical work is underway to
facilitate real-time sharing of wireless capacity. The next step is to envision an
intermediary that would broker requests for secondary access. A number of
experts have incorporated some form of brokering into their technical protocols
for dynamic spectrum access (DSA).89 Viewing the problem from the other
direction, though, the brokering mechanism should be the primary infrastructure
for spectrum allocation, with particular technical schemes for sharing as
subsidiary elements.90 Putting the brokering engine at the center emphasizes the
structural and policy elements to be addressed. I call the universal brokering
engine the SND, or spectrum networking database.
The foundation for the SND is the reference architecture the White Spaces
Database Group proposed to the FCC.91 This architecture involves three main
elements: the repository, the registrar, and the query service.92 The repository
would be the actual database of frequencies, locations, and authorized users. It is
analogous to the DNS “root” database of domain names.93 The repository would
be fed from existing FCC spectrum allocation databases, such as the Universal
Licensing Service (ULS), as well as from registrars. Registrars would take in
information from spectrum users. One kind of users would be protected entities,

See, e.g., M. Buddhikot, et al, DIMSUMnet: new directions in wireless networking using
coordinated dynamic spectrum, World of Wireless Mobile and Multimedia Networks, 2005.
WoWMoM 2005. Sixth IEEE International Symposium on a, 13-16 June 2005 Page(s):78 –
85; T. Maseng & T. Ulversoy, Dynamic Frequency Broker and Cognitive Radio, Cognitive
Radio and Software Defined Radios: Technologies and Techniques, 2008 IET Seminar on, 1818 Sept. 2008 Page(s):1 – 5; DSAP: a protocol for coordinated spectrum access, New Frontiers
in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks, 2005 First IEEE Dyspan International Symposium on
8-11 Nov. 2005 Page(s):611 – 614; Q. Peng et al, “A Distributed Spectrum Sensing Scheme
Based on Credibility and Evidence Theory in Cognitive Radio Context”, 17th IEEE
International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, 2006, at 15.
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such as the incumbent broadcasters and wireless microphone operators. Another
would be white space devices seeking secondary access to the spectrum. The
registrar function parallels the competing registrars that users pay to register and
maintain their domain names. Finally, the query service would check a device
request against the available capacity in the database.94 This is analogous to the
resolver software that Internet service providers and personal computers use to
determine the proper path to a domain name.
The SND would adapt architectural elements of the DNS to spectrum. At the
core, the database would map blocks of spectrum to authorized users of that
spectrum, just as the DNS maps domain names to servers on the Internet. The
database would be granular as to frequencies and location, at a minimum. Before
a device could operate, it would query the SND to identify available transmission
opportunities. The database would return one of two results: the requested
spectrum allows no authorized transmitters, or information about the incumbent
networks and devices authorized to operate there. If the requested spectrum
were empty, the device could register itself as operating in that band and
location, and begin transmitting. If the requested spectrum were occupied, the
device could not operate unless it either met criteria for low-power or ultrawideband underlay operation consistent with the incumbent users, or it
negotiated a license or lease from the incumbent.
Like the DNS, the SND structure could be hierarchical. This would avoid
bottlenecks and facilitate greater local variation. At the top would be redundant
root servers, parallel to the multiple root servers for the DNS. Local SND servers
would query these root servers regularly and cache the results. Each SND server
would therefore have an updated “map” of the spectrum in its geographical reach.
Both the DNS and the White Space Database Group proposal separate the
functions of registries (which store canonical data) and registrars (which
interface with end-users and insert data into the registry). This approach allows
for competition and provides a check on the excessive power of a monopoly
registry. However, it is not without its own dangers. For domain names,
registrar competition is largely circumscribed to price. There is little incentive
for new or better service, so registrars engage in a “race to the bottom” to offer
the cheapest registrations. A high “wholesale” price for the .com domain registry
exacerbated this error, giving registrars little room to maneuver. Spectrum
registrars should have flexibility to innovate, so long as they meet the basic
technical and business requirements to participate in the process.
For the system to operate, all dynamic devices would need unique identifiers,
so they could be tracked and managed through the database.95 A certification
process would need to be established to ensure that devices operate as specified,
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including responding to shut-off commands from the database. That process
could be run directly by the FCC or delegated to private bodies, as with most
communications equipment certification today.
Devices would need the ability to communicate with the database, either
through an existing Internet connection or via a dedicated wireless control
channel. A wireless “control plane” for administrative communications would
parallel the “out of band” architecture of the SS7 signaling network on the public
switched telephone network (PSTN).96 On the Internet, signaling information
uses the same physical channel as the information payload, but utilizes
specialized protocols such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) for connecting
networks and the DNS protocol for domain name resolution queries.97 The SND
would need a separate wireless channel for administrative communication,
because the entire purpose of the system is to establish a physical wireless
connection in a particular spectrum block. This channel could utilize existing
unlicensed frequencies, which are already available throughout the United States,
and in some cases globally harmonized.98
Protected incumbent allocations in the SND could be classified in several
ways.
Some existing uses would preclude any potentially interfering
transmissions. Military systems, radio astronomy bands, avionics, medical
devices, and heavily utilized commercial systems such as cellular telephone
service could be designated for maximum protection.99 Other bands might be
subject to “easements” for low-power use, without permission from existing
users.100 Others could be available on an unlicensed basis when not in use, as
with the TV White Spaces under the FCC order.101 Still others might be available
subject to negotiation with the incumbent. The SND could manage interference
because devices would need to query it prior to initiating transmissions. If a
device were determined to be operating improperly, the system would issue a “no
channel available” message, preventing it from transmitting.

See Kevin Werbach, The Internet’s SS7 Network, RELEASE 1.0, Dec. 1999, available at
cdn.oreilly.com/radar/r1/12-99.pdf.
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Information Infrastructure (U-NII) Devices in the 5 GHz Band, ET Docket No. 03-122 (rel.
June 4, 2003).
98

It is worth pointing out, however, that even these systems, with the exception of radio
astronomy, could at some point become more flexible and dynamic. Public sector spectrum
users could participate in the SND infrastructure on a case-by-case basis. For radio
astronomy, though, there is no way to negotiate with a quasar, so a strict zone of inclusion is
needed.
99

100

See Farber and Faulhaber, supra note 21.

101

See White Spaces Order, supra note 59.

Castle in the Air

Werbach

Page 21

Technical standards for devices would need to be established. As noted
previously, the IEEE 802.22 group is developing standards, but they envision a
more limited White Space database compared to the broader SND vision
sketched out here. The standards adopted would significantly influence the scope
and flexibility of the SND. At an extreme, devices would have full flexibility in
selecting spectrum bands, access models, and transmission modalities. The
reality is that such flexible radios are not yet feasible to build, let along affordable
to sell, despite rapidly advancing research. The functionality of devices will
involve cost/performance tradeoffs. The architects of the SND will have to
determine how and where to restrict those tradeoffs. For example, how often
must devices query the database, and should baseline etiquettes be mandated for
DSA devices to co-exist with each other?
Furthermore, devices might operate on an ad hoc basis, handling all the
spectrum access negotiation themselves, or they might be tied to fixed base
stations. The value of a fixed base station is that a mobile device need only find
and establish contact with the base station, which can have a dedicated link to the
SND. The base station can ensure that the mobile device complies with the
constraints of its authorization. The mobile device would not be able to operate
without confirmation from a base station, so if it were moved outside the
specified transmission area, it would cease to transmit without authorization
from another base station. The architecture in this case would parallel that of
cellular telephone networks. Mobile phone handsets operate by locating a
transmission tower, which authorizes them to communicate, assigns them
temporary frequency slots, and handles “backhaul” of the communication onto
the larger network backbone.

B. Benefits
The power of this system lies in its flexibility. The same basic architecture
could be applied in one set of frequencies (such as the former broadcast television
bands) in a limited geographic area, or it could encompass the entire usable
spectrum nationwide. Moreover, the structure is agnostic between the two
competing allocation mechanisms for more efficient spectrum use: property and
commons. If a frequency band is designated for unlicensed use, the SND would
provide the technical restrictions such as power limits on that band, and
authorize transmission. If the frequency band is licensed, the SND would allow
the licensee to specify terms for secondary access. These could include anything
from open entry so long as the licensee has priority and override capability,
requirement of a reservation or “lease” for the system seeking access,102 or realtime access payments using either a fixed or auctioned price.103

See Peha and Panichpapiboon, supra note 33; Maseng & Ulversoy at p. 3. Note that this
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The SND would allow for a new category of spectrum allocation that is neither
property nor commons. In this scenario, rather than designating frequencies as
either licensed or unlicensed, as it does today, the FCC could establish a set of
initial access algorithms for the SND. These algorithms could vary depending on
the nature of the spectrum involved and the use cases. For some very high
“millimeter wave” frequencies, for example, the FCC has already established a
reservation system, through which users can sign up to operate point-to-point
links on a first-come, first-served basis.104 In other cases, the FCC might
designate a primary user (such as a wide-area high-power system) and a category
of secondary or unlicensed users with rights to operate below certain power
thresholds or when the primary user was not. The approach could be used for socalled ATC (ancillary terrestrial component), in which frequencies designated for
satellite uplink are re-used for terrestrial service through devices able to
determine the angle of signal arrival.105 And it could be used for sharing
spectrum with radar systems that rotate or operate only during circumscribed
time periods.106
As one concrete example, the FCC recently attempted to promote the
deployment of a nationwide interoperable public safety wireless network using
the so-called D Block of frequencies in the 700 MHz bands being vacated by
analog UHF television channels.107 The Commission sought to auction the block
subject to the condition that the winner construct a network capable of both
commercial service and public safety use, with the public safety users having
override capability in times of need.108 The funds from the auction were to be
used to purchase equipment for the public safety users.109 The auction in 2008
failed when no bidder offered the reserve price.110 The FCC is now evaluating
equipment vendor buys the spectrum and charges for devices. The SND establishes the
foundational infrastructure to make this approach more feasible.
See ex parte letter from Richard S. Whitt, Google, to Marlene H. Dortch, FCC, May 21,
2007.
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other options, both for the 700 MHz D Block and for a nationwide interoperable
public safety system.
Under an SND model, the public safety goal could be achieved more readily.
The FCC would designate frequencies in which public safety systems had a
guaranteed override capability. The simplest option would be then to allocate the
system for auction to a private operator, who would get the spectrum subject to
that limitation. Or the spectrum could be made available as unlicensed, subject
to the same condition. The public safety override would then be incorporated
into the technical rules for unlicensed devices approved by the FCC to operate in
the band, and to the relevant technical standards. As a variant, a royalty on each
compliant device could be used to fund the purchase of public safety equipment,
although that would require additional questions about the best funding
mechanism for that goal. In other words, the SND itself does not solve the public
safety problem, but it creates a much larger toolkit for policy-makers to employ.
A collateral benefit of this database-driven approach would be futureproofing. One of the great challenges of wireless communication is that as
technology evolves and usage patterns change, bands may become more or less
heavily used. Incumbent systems, however, can be expensive to clear out of
bands, even when they are not very active. Clearing systems from the bands
given to 2G and 3G cellular systems was extremely expensive, and in some cases
the installed base of devices makes reallocation effectively infeasible. With an
SND architecture, the FCC could change the allocation algorithm when
conditions changed significantly. Because all devices would be required to
operate under the constraints of the SND, migration and adaptation would be
automatic.111
Compared to a pure property rights regime, the SND would be more effective
because the SND functioned as a market-making intermediary. Relying on
individual spectrum owners to negotiate with potential entrants falls victim to the
tragedy of the anticommons.112 There are many externalities and complications
of interference and wireless utilization that property owners are ill-suited to take
into account.113 A pure property system for spectrum is like the old host table for
Internet addresses. It becomes a bottleneck because it has no real-time global
visibility.
The SND would serve the same purpose as the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE): creating the trust and liquidity necessary for a well-functioning market.
The NYSE assigns unique ticker symbols to each stock, but this is a relatively
trivial aspect of its activity. The more important functions of the NYSE include

There would still be costs, and some old devices would stop working and have to be
replaced. But the process would be far smoother and more efficient than it is today.
111

112

See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY (Basic Books 2008).

113

See Supercommons, supra note 12.

Castle in the Air

Werbach

Page 24

serving as the locus for a set of rules, some private and some governmentimposed, that create well-defined rights as the basis for transactions.
Collective mechanisms such as exchanges and government regulation become
necessary when the efficient distribution of property rights is too difficult to
achieve through bilateral transactions. As Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have
noted, property functions both in rem (as a thing against he world) and in
personal (as a bundle of rights attaching to an owner).114 Coase advocated
property rights in spectrum by emphasizing the in personam rights in wireless
equipment, rather than the notional in rem rights in spectrum frequencies.115
The problem, as Merrill and Smith observe, is that the complexity and
uncertainty of spectrum use rights makes private transactional regimes
unworkable or far too limiting.116
The traditional, inefficient solution is
command-and-control regulation. The SND provides a multi-lateral mechanism
to incorporate new spectrum allocation techniques based on commons and
property rights.

C. A Note About Governance
The final and perhaps greatest challenge for implementation of an SND is the
governance structure. Domain names are the technical hinge around which the
Internet rotates. It has long been clear that control over domain name allocation
was perhaps the closest proxy to a central governance function for the resolutely
distributed Internet. The US government, originally through the National
Science Foundation, and later through the Department of Commerce and White
House staff, exerts limited but explicit oversight over the DNS. Operational
decisions, generally reside with ICANN, a quasi-public, quasi-international body
that as been a locus of controversy since its inception.117
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This is not the place to catalog ICANN’s structural flaws and missteps.118
Suffice it to say that governance for the DNS has not been a smooth process. It is
unlikely to be a simple one for spectrum. That being said, many of ICANN’s
challenges do not apply to the SND. ICANN attempts the impossible challenges
of being both public and private, as well as being both global and subject to
national laws. The SND would be squarely subject to the national regulatory
authority of the FCC, but it would delegate many real-time decisions to private
actors. ICANN is nominally a technical coordination body, which finds itself
engaged in significant policy debates, without sufficient procedural and
substantive protections.119 The SND is an implementation mechanism for policy
decisions made and enforced elsewhere, just like the DNS.

CONCLUSION
The SND vision adapts the three architectural attributes of the DNS to
spectrum.
First, the SND would allow a wireless device to ask the question, “Am I
permitted to transmit here, and if so, how?” Today, the answer is hardwired into
the device. Even an unlicensed device such as a WiFi node is strictly limited in
the frequencies, power levels, and protocols it can employ, regardless of its actual
local environment. Resolution – the process of matching the physical device with
the virtual communications space – is paired with the function of transmission.
The DNS breaks this linkage for Internet traffic. Special-purpose infrastructure
handles the process of resolving the location of a network address. Sending and
receiving information is a separate function, which can employ a wide variety of
technical mechanisms for efficient transmission. The SND is similar because it
establishes a special-purpose element of wireless communications infrastructure
that is distinct from the transmission process itself.
Second, the SND would be a fundamentally distributed system. Wireless
devices would query local copies of the database, just as Internet service
providers query local domain name caches. Consistency of data would need to be
assured, but as the DNS demonstrates, that is not incompatible with multiple
redundant copies or competing service providers. For the White Space database,
the FCC has not yet specified whether there can be multiple registrars or
repositories. There is little disagreement on the value of competition between
registrars, and allowing for multiple repositories could also have salutary effects.
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The DNS has suffered because a single entity, NSI, was given control over the
registry function for the .com top-level domain.120
Third, the SND can be agnostic as to uses. As described above, virtually any
policy regime and type of application can be mapped into the database, so long as
it is designed with sufficient flexibility and scalability to handle them. Disputes
over the boundaries of spectrum rights will not disappear, but they will be
separated from disputes over the basic allocation of spectrum.
Creating a DNS for spectrum would generate tremendous benefits. Both
wireless communication and Internet addressing are activities requiring conflict
resolution. The conflicts in wireless communication are between two or more
users who wish to communicate, and the conflicts in Internet addressing are
between two or more users who want the same identifier. The ultimate goal,
however, is not resolve the conflicts, but to promote communication and
productive activity. What mitigates interference going forward is deployment of
smarter devices that can use spectrum in more efficient ways – through both
property rights transactions and commons.
The DNS removed the bottleneck of the host table system, and allowed for
massive growth in the still-decentralized Internet. If the SND could have a small
fraction of that success in the spectrum domain, it would be a tremendous boon
for economic activity, innovation, and open communication.
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